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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: TWO-TIER TRIAL
SYSTEMS AND THE CONTINUING
JEOPARDY PRINCIPLE
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805
(1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
Many states have adopted criminal trial systems that allow de-
fendants to choose a bench trial initially and to demand ajury trial if
dissatisfied with the bench trial results. Injustices of Boston Municipal
Court v. Lydon, 1 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's retrial de
novo after a first-tier bench trial conviction does not violate the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.2 The Supreme
Court concluded that its earlier decision in Burks v. United States3 did
not apply to the two-tier system.4 Burks held that the double jeop-
ardy clause bars a second trial once a reviewing court reverses a
conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at the first
trial was legally insufficient. 5 The Court's decision in Lydon was
based upon strong policies favoring both the defendant and the
state, as well as upon significant distinctions between the Massachu-
setts two-tier system and the situation struck down in Burks.
This Note argues that the Court correctly decided Lydon be-
cause of the significant benefits provided to both the defendant and
the state in the two-tier trial system. The Court wrongly based its
decision, however, on its theory of continuing jeopardy. The
Court's interpretation of continuing jeopardy may create confusion
and lead to future double jeopardy violations. The Court should
1 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984).
2 The fifth amendment provides in part: "[Nior shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The double jeopardy clause was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
3 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
4 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1814. On the same day that Burks was decided, the Court
made Burks applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Greene v. Mas-
sey, 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978).
5 Burks, 437 U.S. at 18.
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have adopted Justice Brennan's theory of continuing jeopardy,
which would have minimized the possibility of future violations and
provided lower courts with a workable theory of continuing
jeopardy.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides
that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb . ... -6 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized three separate guarantees embodied in this constitutional
right: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense." 7 The Court in Lydon evaluated the effectiveness of these
guarantees under the two-tier trial system in Massachusetts.
Under the Massachusetts two-tier system, defendants charged
with certain minor crimes in district and municipal courts may
choose either a bench trial or ajury trial." If defendants elect ajury
trial and are convicted, they may seek appellate review. If they elect
a bench trial and are dissatisfied with the results, they have an abso-
lute right to a jury trial de novo9 without the need to claim judicial
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 1813 (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980)).
The Court noted that it is especially important not to let the State unnecessarily rep-
rosecute a defendant. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1813. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184 (1957), the Court explained that:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged of-
fense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. at 187-88.
8 District and municipal courts in which the two-tier system operates shall exercise
jurisdiction over:
all violations of bylaws, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, made by cities,
towns and public officers, all misdemeanors, except libels, all felonies punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years . . . [including] . . .
breaking and entering a building, ship or vessel; making, possessing or using bur-
glarious instruments and the crimes of escape and attempts to escape from any pe-
nal institution, forgery of a promissory note, or of any order for money or other
property, and of uttering as true a forged note or order, knowing them to be forged.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 26 (West Supp. 1981). The Massachusetts legislature
amended this section several times after Lydon originally was tried and convicted. The
revised section now lists fewer specific crimes and instead refers more generally to sec-
tions in the criminal code.
9 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1807-08. The Massachusetts statute provides that:
Trial of criminal offenses in the Boston municipal court department. . . shall be by
a jury of six, unless the defendant files a written waiver and consent to be tried by
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error at the bench trial. l0 The jury trial is the defendant's only ave-
nue of appeal from the bench trial; a defendant may not obtain ap-
pellate review of the bench trial."i
A. PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON TWO-TIER SYSTEMS
On two recent occasions, the Supreme Court has upheld the
use of two-tier trial systems. The Supreme Court first considered
the constitutionality of a state two-tier trial system 12 in Colten v. Ken-
tucky.' 3 Colten alleged that the Kentucky two-tier trial system vio-
lated the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution.14
The Court found that the Kentucky system was a simple, quick,
and inexpensive procedure. The two-tier system gives defendants
the added benefit of learning about the prosecution's case in the
first trial without revealing their own case until the second trial. 15
The Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause does not
prohibit an enhanced sentence upon reconviction, because the
double jeopardy clause imposes no limitations on the retrial sen-
tencing procedure.' 6 The Court noted that defendants could avoid
the two-tier procedure by pleading guilty and immediately receiving
the court without ajury, subject to his right of appeal therefrom for trial by ajury of
six pursuant to section twenty-seven A. Such waiver shall not be received unless the
defendant is represented by counsel or has filed a written waiver of counsel. Such
trials by jury in the first instance shall be in those jury sessions designated by said
section twenty-seven A for the hearing of such appeals. All provisions of law and
rules of court relative to the hearing and trial of such appeals shall apply also to jury
trials in the first instance.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 218, § 26A (West Supp. 1984).
10 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1808.
11 Id.
12 In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888), the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of the District of Columbia's two-tier system. Like the pre-1978 Massachu-
setts two-tier system, it provided only for a jury trial in the second-tier courts. The
Supreme Court invalidated the procedure, holding that, except for petty offenses, the
right to a jury is guaranteed from the very first moment of any criminal proceeding in
any federal court. Id. at 557. In Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), the
Supreme Court distinguished the applicability of the Callan holding to federal courts
from its applicability to a state two-tier system because the right to a jury trial in a fed-
eral court was mandated by article III of the Constitution, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, d. 3,
in addition to the sixth amendment. Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 629-30.
13 407 U.S. 104 (1972). At the bench trial, Colten was convicted of disorderly con-
duct and fined ten dollars. Id. at 107-08. He then exercised his right to a jury trial de
novo and was convicted again and fined fifty dollars. Id. at 108. After the Kentucky
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, the United States Supreme Court noted prob-
able jurisdiction. 404 U.S. 1014 (1972).
14 Colten, 407 U.S. at 108-09.
15 Id. at 117-18.
16 Id. at 117-20. The Court had rejected earlier the same contention in North Caro-
lina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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a jury trial de novo.17 The Court concluded that the Kentucky de
novo system was constitutional.
In Ludwig v. Massachusetts,18 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Massachusetts two-tier trial system. The defend-
ant challenged the Massachusetts procedure in effect prior to 1978.
The pre-1978 procedure required a first-tier bench trial before the
defendant could appeal for a jury trial de novo. 19 Ludwig argued
that the Massachusetts procedure violated the double jeopardy
clause. 2
0
The Supreme Court rejected Ludwig's double jeopardy conten-
tion. The Court reasoned that the decision to obtain a trial de novo
rested with the accused. 21 The Court analogized the defendant's
right to a trial de novo with the right to a new trial of convicted
defendants who successfully appeal their convictions. 22 In both sit-
uations, the State may reprosecute. 23 The only difference between
the two situations is that under the Massachusetts two-tier system,
defendants may obtain a new trial without alleging any trial error at
their first trial. 24 The Court concluded that nothing in the double
jeopardy clause prevents a state from offering a defendant two
chances for acquittal, and it upheld the two-tier system.
25
17 Colten, 407 U.S. at 118-19.
18 427 U.S. 618 (1976). Ludwig was charged with driving negligently in a manner
that endangered the lives and safety of the public. Id. at 622-23. Prior to the bench trial,
he moved for a speedy jury trial. Id. at 623. The judge denied his motion, convicted
him, and fined him twenty dollars. Id. Prior to his jury trial de novo, Ludwig filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that he had been deprived of a speedy trial and that he
already had been placed in jeopardy. The second-tier trial judge denied the motion, and
Ludwig was convicted again and fined twenty dollars. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 368 Mass. 138, 330
N.E.2d 467 (1975), and Ludwig appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 423 U.S.
945 (1975) (noting probable jurisdiction).
The Supreme Court stated that the Massachusetts system required an initial bench
trial only for certain minor offenses and allowed the defendant an initial jury trial for
serious offenses. Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 625. The Court held that Ludwig presented no
evidence that he would have received a quicker trial absent a de novo system. The Court
added that waiving a jury trial almost always allows a faster determination of a defend-
ant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 629.
19 For a discussion of the pre-1978 Massachusetts two-tier system, see infra note 76
and accompanying text.
20 Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 620.
21 Id. at 631.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 632 (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)).
24 Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 632.
25 Id.
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B. BURKS V. UNITED STATES
In addition to decisions upholding two-tier systems, the
Supreme Court has decided many cases involving a similar situa-
tion-retrial following reversal for insufficient evidence. Before its
decision in Burks,26 the Supreme Court's decisions were inconsistent
and unclear in cases concerning doublejeopardy allegations in retri-
als where the reviewing court had reversed for evidence insufficient
to uphold the verdict. 27 The Supreme Court sometimes had re-
manded cases for new trials and in other cases had granted acquit-
tals, yet never explained why either remedy was appropriate.
28
Because the Supreme Court provided no guidance to lower courts
in choosing the proper remedy, the lower courts created their own
widely varying reasons for deciding whether a new trial or an acquit-
tal should be granted when the evidence in the initial trial was
insufficient.
29
The Burks Court eliminated these inconsistencies by overruling
the four leading cases in this area.30 The Court held that the double
26 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see supra notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
27 Burks, 437 U.S. at 9.
28 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's inconsistencies in this area, see infra note
30 and accompanying text.
29 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
30 The confusion in the Burks line of cases was created initially by the Court in Bryan
v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) (the defendant was convicted of federal income tax
evasion and his motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial in the alternative were
denied). The court of appeals in Burks relied on Bryan as authority for the proposition
that the reviewing court had discretion in determining when to grant a motion for ac-
quittal or remand for a new trial after a defendant's conviction. United States v. Burks,
547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). In Bryan, the reviewing
court had reversed the defendant's conviction for insufficient evidence and directed a
new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's double jeopardy
claim. The Court held that " 'where the accused successfully seeks review of a convic-
tion, there is no doublejeopardy upon a new trial.' " Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. at
560 (quoting Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947); citing Trono v. United
States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-34 (1905), for the same proposition). Because Bryan made no
distinction between reversals for trial error and reversals for insufficient evidence, Bryan
established the rule that a new trial was the appropriate remedy for either type of rever-
sal. See Note, Burks v. United States: Redrawing the Lines in Double Jeopardy, 1979 DEr.
C.L. REv. 193, 195. The Court's failure in Bryan to differentiate between failure of proof
and procedural error as grounds for reversal caused confusion among lower courts. Id.
Five years after Bryan, the Supreme Court faced a similar double jeopardy claim in
Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (per curiam) (a jury in the district court
convicted the defendant of conspiracy to defraud the United States). In Sapir, the appel-
late court reversed the defendant's conviction because of insufficient evidence.
Although the defendant sought acquittal, the appellate court ordered a new trial pre-
sumably following the rule of Bryan. Without presenting case law or authority, the
Supreme Court held that Sapir could not be retried and granted Sapir an acquittal. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated that the granting of a new trial violated the
defendant's double jeopardy right unless the defendant specifically requests a new trial.
1984] 657
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jeopardy clause prohibits a second trial once a reviewing court finds
that the evidence in the first trial is legally insufficient to uphold the
verdict. 3 ' The only "just remedy available" when the evidence is
insufficient is a judgment of acquittal. 32 The Court distinguished
between trial error, which the government may appeal, and failure
of proof, which the government may no longer appeal. 33 The Court
reasoned that a reversal for trial error involves a defect in the judi-
cial process and implies nothing about the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. 34 But reversal because of insufficient evidence involves
the state's failure to prove its case during the one trial permitted by
the double jeopardy clause.35 With the distinction between double
348 U.S. at 374 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas distinguished Sapir from
Bryan by the fact that Sapir had asked only for an acquittal, whereas Bryan had asked for
either an acquittal, or a new trial.
Justice Douglas' distinction between asking for a new trial and asking for a judg-
ment of acquittal was accepted by the Court in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957) (fourteen defendants were convicted of communist conspiracy under the Smith
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1940)). In Yates, the defendants all sought either reversals because
of insufficient evidence or new trials because of errors allegedly committed in the first
trial. The Court ordered acquittals for five defendants because the evidence was clearly
insufficient, but ordered new trials for eight others because the evidence was not clearly
insufficient. Id. at 328-29. The Court confused matters by not clearly explaining the
disparate treatment given to these defendants. Justice Black, however, disagreed and
stated that a finding of insufficient evidence should not allow a court to inflict a second
jeopardy by retrial. Id. at 341-42 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Supreme Court further confused matters in Forman v. United States, 361 U.S.
416 (1960) (defendant was convicted of conspiracy to evade income tax). In Forman, the
defendant alleged procedural trial error and obtained an acquittal by the appellate
court. 259 F.2d 128, 135 (9th Cir. 1958). On rehearing, the same court modified its
prior order and remanded the case for a new trial. 261 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1958). The
Supreme Court concluded that because the defendant himself had requested a new trial,
there was no double jeopardy violation. Forman, 361 U.S. at 425-26. The Supreme
Court again failed to differentiate between the two grounds for reversal. Realizing that
these cases offered little assistance to a lower court in deciding whether to grant an
acquittal or remand for retrial, the Court in Burks overruled them. Burks, 437 U.S. at 18.
31 437 U.S. at 18. In Burks, the defendant was convicted of robbing a federally in-
sured bank, despite substantial evidence that he suffered mental disorders and was inca-
pable of conforming his behavior to the law. Id. at 3. The court of appeals reversed the
conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence and remanded the case to the trial
court to either issue an acquittal or order a new trial. Id. at 3-4. The defendant ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, contending that appellate reversal for legally insufficient
evidence was the equivalent of ajudgment of acquittal. An acquittal would have barred
retrial. Id. at 5.
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id. at 15-16.
34 Id. at 15. See also Note, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insuffi-
dent Evidence, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 365, 370 (1964) (discussing the differing interests be-
tween society and a defendant if trial error was sufficient for acquittal of defendant by
the reviewing court).
35 Burks, 437 U.S. at 16; see also Note, supra note 34, for a discussion of the interests
of defendant and society when the evidence is found to be legally insufficient.
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jeopardy violations and allowable retrials firmly established in Burks,
the Supreme Court decided Lydon.
III. FACTS
Michael Lydon was arrested after breaking into an automobile
and charged with possession of burglarious instruments with intent
to commit larceny. 36 Lydon chose a bench trial and was convicted.
The bench trial judge rejected Lydon's claim that the state had
failed to prove his intent to steal money or property from the auto-
mobile.3 7 After the bench trial, Lydon requested ajury trial de novo
and was released on personal recognizance pending retrial. Lydon
petitioned the jury session judge38 to dismiss the charge against him
on the grounds that the state presented insufficient evidence at the
bench trial.39 Lydon alleged that his retrial would violate his double
jeopardy right. Lydon claimed that the decision in Burks prohibited
the state from trying him twice for the same offense.40 The jury ses-
sion judge denied Lydon's motion.4 1
Alleging that the jury trial de novo violated his double jeopardy
right, Lydon petitioned the single justice session of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court 42 and received a stay of his jury trial.43
The justice then asked the full court to review Lydon's double jeop-
ardy claim. 44 The Supreme Judicial Court held that the jury trial de
36 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1808.
37 Id.
38 The jury session judge is the second-tier judge in the Massachusetts system who
presides over the jury trial de novo. MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 27A (West 1974
& Supp. 1984).
39 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1808.
40 Id. Lydon claimed that because the evidence presented at the bench trial was le-
gally insufficient to justify his conviction, Burks precluded a de novo trial by jury. Id.
41 Id.
42 The superintendence of inferior courts statute provides that the SupremeJudicial
Court shall have "general superintendance" power over the Massachusetts courts of in-
ferior jurisdiction. The general superintendance power includes the power to issue
"such writs, summonses and other processes and such orders, directions and rules as
may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice .... "MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 211, § 3 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984).
The single justice session allows defendants to bring appeals to one member of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, who then may dismiss the claim or report it to
the full court for possible action. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 211, §§ 3, 4A (West 1974 &
Supp. 1984).
43 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1808.
44 Justice Wilkens indicated that he believed the evidence was legally insufficient to
support Lydon's conviction, but did not report a finding on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. Instead, he reported two questions to the full bench:
1. Is it a denial of a defendant's right not to be placed in double jeopardy to require
him to go through ajury trial, requested by him without waiving his rights, when the
evidence at the bench trial was insufficient to warrant a conviction?
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novo would not place Lydon in double jeopardy,45 that Burks was
inapplicable because no appellate court had ruled that the evidence
at Lydon's first trial was insufficient, and that no court would ever
review the bench trial conviction under Massachusetts law.46 The
Supreme Court denied Lydon's writ of certiorari on his doublejeop-
ardy allegations.
47
Lydon then left the state court system and petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts. The district court granted the writ. The court
ruled that it had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 225448 because
Lydon was in custody and had exhausted all his state remedies, ex-
cept for a retrial.49 After reviewing the original trial transcript, the
district court found that the evidence against Lydon was legally in-
sufficient to support a conviction and concluded that under Burks,
the double jeopardy clause barred retrial.50
The Commonwealth appealed the decision on the grounds that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus relief
and that Lydon's jury trial de novo would not violate the double
jeopardy clause. 51 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
2. Assuming that a jury trial in such an instance would be a denial of a defendant's
right not to be placed in double jeopardy, may the issue of the sufficiency of the
evidence at the bench trial be considered again at the trial court level, assuming, of
course, that the judge at the bench trial has denied an appropriate request for a
ruling that the evidence at the bench trial was insufficient?
Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 358 n.3, 409 N.E.2d 745, 747 n.3, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1065 (1980).
45 Id. at 356, 409 N.E.2d at 745.
46 Id. at 360-61, 409 N.E.2d at 748-49.
47 449 U.S. 1065 (1980).
48 Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municiple Court, 536 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Mass),
aft'd, 698 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984). The
custody and exhaustion requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provide in part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant
has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
(emphasis added).
49 Lydon, 536 F. Supp. at 650. The federal district court found that Lydon's release
on personal recognizance met technical custody requirements for habeas corpus review
because Lydon's presence could be demanded by state judicial officials having power to
reimpose his original sentence. Id. at 649-50; see also Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411
U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (defendant released under order of state court staying sentence is
"in custody" within meaning of habeas corpus statute).
50 Lydon, 536 F. Supp. at 652.
51 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1809.
660 (Vol. 75
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
district court's holding. 52 One justice dissented and stated that the
two-tier system provided all the double jeopardy protection of a
more conventional single-tier system and allowed defendants an ad-
ditional opportunity to be acquitted on the facts. 53 The dissent ar-
gued that the fifth amendment did not require the result in the First
Circuit's decision and that the decision undermined a fair and useful
criminal procedure. 54 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider both the jurisdictional and double jeopardy issues.55
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Injustices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 56 the Supreme Court
reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals and held that the de-
fendant's jury trial de novo without a judicial determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence at his prior trial does not violate the
double jeopardy clause. 57 Through Justice White,58 the Court set
forth three reasons for its decision. First, the Court held that the
concept of "continuing jeopardy" is implicit in the double jeopardy
clause. Lydon's first-tier conviction did not terminate jeopardy, but
52 Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court, 698 F.2d 1, 7 (Ist Cir. 1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984). The court concluded that habeas corpus relief was proper for
Lydon and that under Burks, Lydon could not be retried.
53 Id. at 11 (Campbell, J., dissenting). The dissent stressed that if Lydon had fol-
lowed the prescribed procedure, he would have been acquitted for insufficient evidence
at both the de novo jury trial and the appellate court. Id. at 12.
54 Id. at 10 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
55 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983).
56 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984).
57 Id. at 1814.
58 Justice White delivered the Court's opinion, in whichJustices Blackmun and Rehn-
quistjoined. Justice Brennan, joined by justice Marshall, filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice O'Connor filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Before rejecting Lydon's double jeopardy claims, the Court examined the habeas
corpus jurisdictional question. The Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit Court
of Appeals that the district court was correct in maintaining jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b). Id. at 1811. For the exact language of federal habeas corpus sections dis-
cussed by the Court, see supra note 48.
Justice O'Connor concurred only in the judgment of the Court because she con-
cluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Lydon's habeas petition. Lydon,
104 S. Ct. at 1828-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor
concluded that Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973), controlled the denial
of Lydon's habeas corpus writ. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1829-30 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment). Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger joined, agreed with
Justice O'Connor that there was no federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for Lydon, but
joined in the rest of the Court's opinion rejecting Lydon's double jeopardy claims. Ly-
don, 104 S. Ct. at 1823 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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merely continued the jeopardy through the second-tier trial. 59 Sec-
ond, the Court held that the defendant's voluntary choice to partici-
pate in a first-tier trial without the possibility of appellate review did
not violate his double jeopardy right and was consistent with the
Court's previous decisions upholding two-tier trial systems.60
Third, the Court held that the Massachusetts two-tier system does
not violate any of the policies underlying the double jeopardy prohi-
bition and provides significant advantages to both the defendant
and the state.
A. THE CONTINUING JEOPARDY THEORY
Justice White stated that the Supreme Court has recognized the
concept of "continuing jeopardy" 6' and that continuing jeopardy is
applicable "where criminal proceedings against an accused have not
run their full course." 62 "Full course" is the end of all legal pro-
ceedings for defendants; either the defendants are acquitted or their
convictions become final after they exhaust all methods of appeal. 63
The Court explained that if an accused is acquitted, the initial jeop-
ardy terminates, and any retrial would subject the accused to double
jeopardy.64 Furthermore, the Court in Burks recognized that an un-
reversed determination by a reviewing court that the evidence at the
trial was legally insufficient also terminates the initial jeopardy. But
a conviction does not terminate the initial jeopardy, the Court ex-
plained, because an appeal or a new trial merely continues the initial
jeopardy. Jeopardy ends when the criminal proceedings reach their
full course. 65 The Court reasoned that if the bench trial judge had
acquitted Lydon, Lydon's retrial would be barred under the double
jeopardy clause. But Lydon simply asserted in his appeal that the
bench trial judge should have acquitted him. A "claim of eviden-
59 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1813-14. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
60 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1813. For a discussion of previous Supreme Court decisions
concerning two-tier systems, see supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
61 Lydon,104 S. Ct. at 1814 (citing Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 534 (1975); Price v.
Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970)).
62 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1813-14 (quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 326). In Price,
the Court held that the defendant could be retried for voluntary manslaughter following
the reversal of his conviction on appeal. 398 U.S. at 326. The Court allowed the retrial
on the basis of United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), which held that the state may
reprosecute after reversal of a defendant's conviction. Id. In Ball, the retrial was
granted after the reviewing court determined that fatally defective indictments consti-
tuted trial error. Id. at 664.
63 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957) (citing State v. Aus, 105 Mont.
82, 69 P.2d 584 (1937)).




tiary failure [by a defendant] and a legal judgment to that effect...
have different consequences under the Double Jeopardy Clause."
66
Unlike the defendant in Burks, Lydon's conviction had not been re-
versed due to failure of proof, and the second-tier jury trial was part
of his continuing jeopardy. "While technically [the defendant] is
'tried again,' the second stage proceeding can be regarded as but an
enlarged, fact-sensitive part of a single continuous course ofjudicial
proceedings . "..."67
Justice Brennan concurred in part and concurred in the judg-
ment because he agreed with the Court that Lydon's guilty verdict
did not" 'terminate' one trial and thereby permit a claim that a sec-
ond trial was barred due to insufficient evidence."'68 Justice Bren-
nan, however, disagreed strongly with the Court's use of the
continuing jeopardy concept. He objected to the state's characteriz-
ing the legal judgment as the jeopardy-terminating point; this ap-
proach sets no limit to a state's ability to withhold the necessary
legal judgment to maintain continuing jeopardy and to justify re-
peated attempts to gain a conviction.69 Justice Brennan also criti-
cized the Court for justifying the Ball rule,70 which allows retrial
after reversal for trial error, with the notion that convictions at trial
do not terminate jeopardy.7 1 Justice Brennan believed that the
Court adopted the Ball rule because the "sound administration of
justice" requires that the government be allowed to retry defend-
ants following reversals for trial error.7 2 Justice Brennan argued
66 Id. (emphasis added).
67 Id. (quoting Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court, 698 F.2d 1, 12 (Ist Cir.
1982) (Campbell, J., dissenting), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1805 (1984)).
68 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1823 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
69 Id. at 1817 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
70 Id. at 1818 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See
supra note 62.
71 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1818 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
72 Id. (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); citing Tibbs v. Flor-
ida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 (1982); United States v. Francesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980);
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 882, 889-92 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 343-44, n.ll (1975)).
Justice Brennan also noted that the Court cited Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329
(1970), for support of its statement that continuing jeopardy is implicit in Ball. Lydon,
104 S. Ct. at 1818 n.4 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Brennan concluded that Price did not approve of the continuing jeopardy ap-
proach. Id. (citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 328 n.3). Justice Brennan urged that
Price suggests that continuing jeopardy reflects a variety of interests, including "fairness
to society, lack of finality, and limited waiver ... " Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1818 n.4 (Bren-




that the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause incorporate
the "serving justice" notion.
B. DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CHOICE
In addition to concluding that the Massachusetts system does
not violate double jeopardy principles, the Court noted that the de-
fendant had chosen freely a first-tier bench trial that did not allow
for appellate review.73 The Court concluded that "'nothing in the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a State from affording a defend-
ant two opportunities to avoid conviction and secure an acquit-
tal.' ",74 Justice Brennan also concurred with the Court that Lydon's
voluntary choice in accepting the advantages flowing from the two-
tier system did not violate his double jeopardy right.
75
The Court emphasized that its earlier decision in Ludwig v. Mas-
sachusetts,76 upholding the two-tier system in Massachusetts, was not
73 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1812. The Court reasoned that Lydon's voluntary choice of a
trial de novo puts him in no different a position than convicted defendants who are
successful in having their convictions reversed and their cases remanded for a new trial.
Id. Safeguards are provided in the statute so that defendants who elect to waive their
right to a jury trial initially must be represented by counsel or have signed a written
waiver of counsel. See supra note 9.
In Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 409 N.E.2d 745, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1065 (1980), the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts relied heavily on the fact that
because Lydon had waived his right to a jury trial and knowingly elected a bench trial
without the availability of appellate review, he had waived his right to be free from being
placed in double jeopardy. Id. at 365, 409 N.E.2d at 751. The Massachusetts court,
however, indicated in a footnote that although the consent form informs defendants that
if they are dissatisfied with the results of the bench trial, they may request a de novo jury
trial, the consent form should be enlarged so that defendants acknowledge that their
only avenue of relief from any error in the bench trial is a trial de novo. Id. at 365 n.13,
409 N.E.2d at 751 n.13.
But see Comment, DoubleJeopardy Problems Presented by Two-Tier Systems, 69 GEO. LJ.
1525, 1537-41 (1981); Comment, Lydon v. Commonwealth- Double Jeopardy and the De
Novo System-Challenging the Sufficiency of the Evidence Presented at the Original Trial, 16 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 303, 315-20 (1981). These commentators criticized the Massachusetts
court's decision because the defendant's waiver of his double jeopardy right was made
without a full appreciation of the consequences of a bench trial denying review of the
sufficiency of the evidence. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (setting forth the
requirements for an effective waiver of constitutional rights). The Supreme Court in
Lydon avoided this potential problem by refusing to characterize the defendant's choice
of a bench trial as a waiver of his double jeopardy right. Instead, the Court concluded
that Lydon's double jeopardy right was not violated by the two-tier system and that he
was free to receive two chances for an acquittal. 104 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
74 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1815-16 (quoting Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. at 632).
75 104 S. Ct. at 1822-23 & n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
76 427 U.S. 618 (1976). In Ludwig, the Court upheld a prior Massachusetts two-tier
system of trials for minor criminal offenses that differed only slightly from the present
system. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. Prior to the Massachusetts Court
Reorganization Act of 1978, defendants were required to have a first-tier bench trial
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disturbed by its later decision in Burks.77 The Court explained that
Burks barred a second trial after a reviewing court reversed a convic-
tion for failure of proof at trial. Because Lydon would never receive
an evidentiary review of his bench trial, Burks does not apply to this
situation. 78
C. POLICY ADVANTAGES OF THE TWO-TIER SYSTEM
Justice White evaluated the policies underlying the double
jeopardy clause as an independent reason for finding Lydon's
double jeopardy claims to be without merit. The Court stressed
that the Massachusetts two-tier trial system thwarted none of the
guarantees of the double jeopardy clause.79 The Commonwealth
was not attempting to punish Lydon twice for the same offense,8 0
nor was it trying to convict Lydon after his acquittal.81 The Com-
monwealth was satisfied with Lydon's bench trial conviction and
would have accepted the results of a jury trial had Lydon chosen to
bypass the first-tier trial.
The Court emphasized that the double jeopardy clause does
not absolutely bar retrial of the defendant. The Court justified retri-
als by maintaining that society's interests in punishing guilty defend-
ants following fair trials are consistent with defendants' interests in
obtaining fair trials.8 2 Society would pay a very high price if all trial
defects that are sufficient to constitute reversible trial error thereby
immunized every accused from punishment.8 3 Retrials allow society
the opportunity to prosecute fairly all defendants and to obtain con-
victions of those who are guilty. Defendants also benefit from the
strong protection reviewing courts afford against improprieties at
the trial or pretrial stage. If reversals of convictions because of trial
error irrevocably would place defendants beyond further prosecu-
tion, appellate courts would be less zealous in protecting defendants
before proceeding to a jury trial. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1811. Under the present system,
defendants may avoid the bench trial and proceed directly to the jury trial. Id. They
also may elect a bench trial in the first-tier and then request another bench trial in the
second-tier trial. Id. at 1807-08 & n.1. The Court also had upheld previously Ken-
tucky's two-tier de novo system against similar double jeopardy allegations indicating
the Court's willingness to accept the two-tier system. See supra notes 12-17 and accom-
panying text.
77 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1814.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1813. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
80 Id.
81 Id. The Court suggested that the defendant's problem is that he was not acquit-
ted, and "simply maintains that he ought to have been." Id.
82 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1813 (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
83 Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466.
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against trial error. 84
The Court also rejected Lydon's double jeopardy claims be-
cause the two-tier system is not the kind of "governmental oppres-
sion" against which the fifth amendment protects. 85 The two-tier
system instead offers substantial benefits to defendants and the
state.86 The two-tier system allows defendants to preview the prose-
cution's case at the first-tier bench trial; if defendants are convicted,
they will have a better opportunity to prepare for the second-tier
jury trial. 87 Because an acquittal at the first-tier bench trial pre-
cludes a retrial, the defendant also knows that the prosecution must
present its strongest case in the first-tier bench trial. 88 Justice Bren-
nan also pointed out that the availability of a second-tier jury trial
will reduce defendants' anxiety over the outcome of the first-tier
trial.8
9
The state also favors the two-tier system; because many defend-
ants forego their right to a second-tier trial after being convicted at
the bench trial, the state disposes of many cases quickly and
cheaply. 90 The Court concluded that upholding Lydon's double
jeopardy claims would destroy a "useful and fair state procedure"91




The decision in Lydon combines a poorly reasoned theory of
continuing jeopardy with a shrewd appreciation of the efficient two-
tier trial system. The Court's interpretation of the continuing jeop-
ardy principle does not protect defendants against double jeopardy
infringements, but instead will allow future violations. The Court's
analysis would have been much stronger if it had adopted Justice
84 Id.
85 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1814. The theory that the double jeopardy clause protects the
accused from "governmental oppression" was stated in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82, 91 (1978). Decided on the same day as Burks, the Scott decision held that where
defendants themselves seek to have their trials terminated without any submission to
either judge or jury as to their guilt or innocence, an appeal by the government from
their successful efforts to do so does not offend the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 100-
01.
86 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1815.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1822 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
90 Id. at 1815 n.8. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
91 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1816 (quoting Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court,
698 F.2d 1, 10 (st Cir. 1982) (Campbell, J., dissenting)).
92 Lydon, 698 F.2d at 11-12 (Campbell, J. dissenting).
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Brennan's more persuasive explanation of the principle and applica-
tion of continuing jeopardy.
A. CONTINUING JEOPARDY
Under the Court's theory of continuing jeopardy, the initial
jeopardy terminates when the accused is acquitted because any re-
trial following an acquittal places the accused in doublejeopardy. A
conviction, however, does not terminate the initial jeopardy. A new
trial following a conviction simply continues the intitial jeopardy
and does not place the defendant twice in jeopardy.95
As Justice Brennan noted in his concurrence, however, the
Court's use of the continuing jeopardy concept is inappropriate.94
The Court in Price did not approve of the continuing jeopardy ap-
proach. The Court instead considered it to be merely a label repre-
senting a combination of interests, including "fairness to society,
lack of finality, and limited waiver."9 5 The Court in Lydon thus gave
great significance to a label that previously had little value. Before
Lydon, furthermore, a majority of the Court never had agreed that
continuing jeopardy had any importance as a theory. 96 The Court
before Lydon had been reluctant to allow a continuing jeopardy no-
tion to defeat a defendant's double jeopardy allegations. 97
In United States v. Wilson,98 the Court rejected the theory of con-
tinuingjeopardy because it would have allowed the government to
appeal after a verdict of acquittal.99 The Court was concerned that
the prosecution would claim a new trial on the ground that thejeop-
93 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
94 104 S. Ct. at 1818 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
95 Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970). For the Lydon Court's interpretation of
Price, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
96 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1818 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citing United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975)).
97 See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
98 420 U.S. 332 (1975). Wilson was decided five years after the Court's decision in
Price. Wilson was indicted and convicted for illegal conversion of union funds. The
conviction was reversed on the ground that impermissible delay between the offense and
the indictment prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. The Government ap-
pealed and the Court held that the appeal did not violate the double jeopardy clause. Id.
99 Id. at 352. See also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (Court rejected the
continuing jeopardy notion). Commentators also have noted that the Court has never
considered the continuing jeopardy theory to be persuasive. See Note, Double Jeopardy-
Juvenile Courts-Transfer to Criminal Court-Adjudicatory Proceedings-Breed v. Jones, 95 S.
Ct. 1779 (1975), 9 AKRON L. REV. 389, 395 (1975); Note, Criminal Procedure-Double Jeop-
ardy-Government's Right To Appeal A Midtrial Dismissal-United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct.
2187 (1978), 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 742, 753; Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver ofJurisdic-
tion in California's Juvenile Courts, 24 STAN. L. REV. 874, 888 (1972).
1984] 667
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
ardy merely continued following the acquittal and that, therefore,
the new trial did not subject the defendant to double jeopardy.1
0 0
The Court in Lydon failed to explain why a theory that the Court
previously neither accepted nor found significant now suddenly be-
came dispositive.10
The Court's use of the continuing jeopardy theory also could
encourage states to violate defendants' rights. Misapplication of the
continuing jeopardy theory would allow states to withhold legal
judgments terminating jeopardy until the prosecution decides that
the cases have run their full course. States, therefore, could create
prolonged periods ofjeopardy during which the prosecution could
attempt to gain convictions. 10 2 The Court also created the possibil-
ity of multiple convictions for the same offense. 10 3 Under the
Court's continuing jeopardy theory, a state not satisfied with a
second degree murder conviction could reprosecute the defendant
in hopes of a first degree murder conviction because a conviction
does not terminate the initial jeopardy. Multiple convictions for the
same offense, however, are clearly contrary to the double jeopardy
guarantees previously established by the Supreme Court in Green.1
0 4
The Court in Lydon could have avoided these problems by
adopting Justice Brennan's continuing jeopardy theory. In his two-
step approach, Justice Brennan requires a court to ask, first, whether
the initial proceeding has now objectively ended and, second,
whether a new proceeding would violate the double jeopardy
clause. 10 5 The answer to the first question would be influenced "but
not controlled by the States' characterization of the status of the
proceedings .... "o106 Unlike the Court's approach, which grants
total control to the state in determining what constitutes the full
course of the proceedings, Justice Brennan gives the discretion to
the courts. Courts could answer fairly the question of whether the
trial has ended primarily by looking at the status of the criminal pro-
ceedings and the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause,
such as avoidance of unnecessary anxiety, insecurity, and embarrass-
100 Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352.
101 104 S. Ct. at 1817-18 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
102 Id. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
103 Id. at 1818 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
But see Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980), which specifically prohibits multiple con-
victions for the same offense under the double jeopardy clause.
104 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.





ment. 0 7 The answer to the second question of whether a new trial
would violate the double jeopardy clause would be consistent with
the Burks analysis. If the reviewing court finds that the evidence in
the first-tier bench trial is legally insufficient, a new proceeding
would violate the double jeopardy clause.' 08 If the first-tier trial is
reversed for trial error, a new proceeding would not violate the
double jeopardy clause.10 9
Applying his two-step analysis to the facts in Lydon, Justice
Brennan indicated that the defendant's first-tier bench trial was a
completed trial because the Court found the defendant guilty. Jus-
tice Brennan, however, concluded that the guilty finding at the first-
tier bench trial did not terminate the jeopardy because the trial did
not subject the defendant to the ordeal, anxiety, and embarrassment
that the double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent. 1 0 The
first-tier verdict also has much less significance than the verdict in a
single-tier system because the defendant knows that a second fact-
finding opportunity is available after the bench trial."' Justice
Brennan's theory of continuing jeopardy neither leaves a defend-
ant's double jeopardy right at the mercy of the prosecution's inter-
pretation of the full course of the proceedings nor contradicts the
Burks rule barring retrial after a determination of insufficient
evidence.
Though the Court in Lydon for the first time relied on the con-
tinuing jeopardy theory, the negative impact of the Court's theory
already has surfaced in Richardson v. United States.112 In Richardson,
the Court held that a jury's failure to reach a verdict in a single-tier
system and the trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a
hung jury did not terminate jeopardy."13 The Court concluded that
under the theory of continuing jeopardy set forth in Lydon and Price,
only the acquittal of Richardson will terminate the original jeop-
ardy."t 4 The jury's failure to reach a verdict was not considered the
equivalent of an acquittal. 15 Justice Brennan dissented in part and
noted that a new trial after a hung jury subjected the defendant to
all the risks and burdens that the double jeopardy clause sought to
107 Id. at 1821-22 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
108 Id. at 1821 & n.6 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1822 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
111 Id.
112 104 S. Ct. 3081 (1984). The District Court for the District of Columbia, under a
single-tier system, convicted the defendant of federal narcotics violations.
113 Richardson, 104 S. Ct. at 3086-87.




prevent."a 6 He distinguished the retrials in Lydon on the ground
that Richardson had received none of the benefits of the two-tier
system that mitigated the harms prohibited by the double jeopardy
clause.1 7 Because the Court concluded that a hung jury continues
the intitial jeopardy, the Court subjects defendants to double jeop-
ardy by requiring a new trial.
118
Though the Court in Lydon did not incorporate explicitly the
policy advantages of the two-tier system in its formulation of the
continuing jeopardy concept, the Court nonetheless was influenced
by these policies in rejecting Lydon's doublejeopardy claim. 19 The
Court found several advantages to defendants under the two-tier
system. Defendants can choose a first-tier bench trial, preview the
prosecution's evidence against them, and thereby better prepare for
their defense at the second-tier trial.' 20 Defendants always have two
full fact-finding opportunities to produce an acquittal. 12 1 Because
an acquittal at the first-tier bench trial will bar another trial, the
prosecution must put forth its best case initially. 122 Defendants also
suffer less anxiety during the first trial because they have an absolute
right to a trial de novo. 123 The defendants in Massachusetts not
only were aware of these benefits, but also took advantage of them.
One study revealed that of all defendants eligible to participate in
the two-tier trial system, only nine percent of those defendants
chose a second-tier jury trial initially.'
24
The Court also was influenced by the strong advantages the
two-tier system offered the state. The system allows the state to dis-
pose of thousands of criminal proceedings quickly and inexpen-
sively because most defendants are either acquitted by the first-tier
bench trial judge or do not appeal because first-tier judges usually
impose mild sentences. 125 Because of these advantages, almost one-
116 Id. at 3087-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 Id. at 3088 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). All the
emotional significance and anxiety are present when defendants have only one attempt
to influence the fact finder. Id.
118 Id. at 3088 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But
see United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (retrial following hung jury does not
violate double jeopardy clause).
119 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1814-15.
120 Id. at 1815.
121 Id. at 1823 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
122 Id. at 1815.
123 Id. at 1814-15 (citing Mann v. Commonwealth, 359 Mass. 661, 271 N.E.2d 331
(1971) (previous Massachusetts case upholding the constitutionality of the two-tier
system)).
124 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1815 n.8 (citing Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 359
n.5, 409 N.E.2d 745, 748 n.5, cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980)).
125 See Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56, 83 n.40 (1976)
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half of the states have adopted two-tier trial systems. 126
The Court emphasized that these advantages to defendants and
states protect the purposes underlying the double jeopardy clause.
The two-tier system balances the interest of defendants in receiving
a fair trial with society's interest in punishing the guilty. 127 Until the
criminal proceedings have run their full course, society's interest in
prosecuting defendants remains. Justice Brennan agreed with the
Court that these interests should be balanced, but only if the courts,
and not the prosecution, do the balancing. The courts should deter-
mine when the proceedings have ended and when the jeopardy is
terminated.
The Court also was acutely aware of the impact its decision
would have on many states' criminal justice systems had it upheld
Lydon's claims. That decision would have authorized long delays
for defendants challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in their
first-tier bench trial. Instead of proceeding directly to a second-tier
jury trial, a state reviewing court would have to decide the merits of
the defendant's evidentiary claims. 128 By eliminating the need for a
court to review these claims, the Court in Lydon allows two-tier sys-
tems in every state to proceed quickly from first-tier bench trials to
second-tier jury trials. The costs of court review are also decreased
because defendants' only avenue of appeal is a second-tier jury trial.
As the Court concluded, a contrary holding would have led to the
destruction of a "useful and fair state procedure.
'129
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Lydon was wise and pragmatic in light of
the delays, increased costs, and reductions in efficiency that would
have resulted in many state criminal systems if the Court had struck
("Speedy conviction and sentencing of the guilty increases the deterrent effect of
punishment, and permits rehabilitation or incapacitation of the criminal before he is
able to commit additional crimes. Rapid acquittal of the innocent decreases the burden
of pre-trial detention for defendants unable to post bail.").
126 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 44-509 (1977 & Supp. 1979); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 37, COLO.
REv. STAT. § 13-6-310 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3609, 22-3609a, 22-3610 (1983);
39 MD. R. P. 911, 1314; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 218, § 26A (West Supp. 1984); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 774.34 (West 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-1 (1972); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-17-311 (1983); NEV. REv. STAT. § 189.010 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 502-A:1 1-12, 599 (1968); N.M. STAT. § 39-3-1 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1431
(1978 & Supp. 1981); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 37 (g); PA. R. CRIM. P. 6006; TEx. CRIM. P. CODE
ANN. art. 44.17, 45.10 (Vernon 1979); Va. Code § 16.1-136 (1982 & Supp. 1984); W.
VA. CODE § 50-5-13 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
127 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
128 Lydon, 698 F.2d at 11 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
129 Lydon, 104 S. Ct. at 1816 (quoting id. at 10).
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down the two-tier system in Massachusetts. The Lydon decision will
not subject defendants to double jeopardy violations in two-tier sys-
tems because the system affords them two full opportunities for ac-
quittal without the embarrassment, cost, and emotional trauma that
the double jeopardy clause prohibits. It is unfortunate, however,
that the Court based its decision partly on its theory of continuing
jeopardy. A continuing jeopardy theory that leaves sole discretion
to the prosecution to decide when the defendant's jeopardy termi-
nates may lead to future double jeopardy violations. By adopting
Justice Brennan's theory of continuingjeopardy, which is based on a
court's determination of the double jeopardy clause purposes and
not on a state's determination of when a proceeding has run its full
course, the Court would have eliminated future constitutional viola-
tions and provided lower courts with a workable theory of continu-
ing jeopardy.
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